

Protest policing explanations and its limitations in the Argentine context
Fernanda Page Poma¹

Abstract

States are sometimes contradictory in their responses to protest. The same government might ignore a massive demonstration in a capital city but send dozens of troops to guard a small protest in a provincial town. Why are state responses to collective action so different? How may one account for such differences in the protest policing policies of the same country? For decades, social movement scholars have sought answers to why authorities react as they do to protest. While existing research has found support for a threat hypothesis –authorities respond to behavioral threats with repression– as Davenport (2007) argues, it is not clear how this process works, what precisely do authorities respond to –death, property damage, wildly unorthodox behavior, or the magnitude, frequency, and location of challenging activity? In this paper, I will look at the dominant models that explain protest policing to discuss how these can be used in the Argentine scenario. I shall argue that to understand protest policing in Argentina, we must attend to contextual factors, the history of police agencies, power struggles and correlations of forces, as well as contingency during the actual circumstances when and where the event happened.

¹ SUNY Stony Brook

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History shows states are sometimes contradictory in their responses to protest. The same government might allow the blockade of an international bridge, but use violence to end the occupation of a factory. Similarly, authorities might ignore a massive demonstration in a capital city but send dozens of troops to guard a small protest in a provincial town. Furthermore, state control of protests can be manifested with very different forms of policing. From sending local town agents to prevent the blockade of a road, to ordering federal forces use tear gas and bullets against unarmed demonstrators asking for a wage increase or more employment opportunities.

Why are state responses to collective action so different? For decades, social movement scholars have sought answers to why authorities react as they do to protest. Christian Davenport, a Political Scientist who has spent considerable time researching this question, argues that while we do have evidence that police are more inclined to respond violently in certain circumstances it is still not definitively clear how they actually reach a decision to act passively or aggressively ((Davenport, Soule et al. 2011) Davenport 2007). What precisely do authorities respond to, death, property damage, wildly unorthodox behavior, or the magnitude, frequency, and location of challenging activity? There are several models or theories that try to explain this, yet, none of them with the Latin American context as background.

During the 1990s Latin American countries have witnessed a dramatic emergence in collective action by unemployed workers. Deproletarianization, state-retrenchment, and decentralization of state services are some of the processes that lie at the root of the upsurge of contention (Auyero and Moran 2007). This surge in unemployed workers and *piquetero* protest events was coupled with a depiction of protests as violent and dangerous by the media (Svampa & Pandolfi 2004, Artese 2006). This, in turn, led to high levels of police control and imprisonment of protesters. These dynamics complicate what we already know about state responses to social movements, by creating unique and unstable relationships between the state and the general population.

Political scientists, specializing in state policy and social movements, explore the relationship between the states and challenging groups at both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Conversely, sociologists, who look at social movements and political processes, tend to study how political opportunities are an important factor that shape state responses to protest in democratic environments. Neither, however, have explored states that are democratic at the federal level but are less democratic² at the subnational level (Behrend 2011). How does protest policing vary within the same country? Similarly, neither have studied protest policing in a country with a tradition of militarized police. In this paper, I will present and discuss the current models in protest policing while taking the case of Argentina into account.

² A discussion of democratic regimes and practices at the subnational level is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, following Behrend (2011) I agree, “the different ways in which subnational democracy unfolds do not necessarily mean that the least democratic provinces in a country are authoritarian” (152).

Definitions

From repression to protest policing: Charles Tilly once wrote: “repression is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and facilitation” (Tilly 1978) But how is repression selective? Why are state responses to collective action so different? The definition of repression, like other social concepts, is controversial.

Much of the social movement literature tends to view repression as state repression, but repression should not be limited to state action. What is more, repression may take many forms, and counter-movements, the mass media, political parties, civil society, and individual citizens are also involved (Earl 2003, 2006; Davenport 2005, 2007). Repression scholars have also identified less overt forms of repression such as “clandestine kicks and invisible elbows” as Auyero (2010) calls non-traditional forms of power, domination and violence used by state agents to control those living in the margins of society. Ferre (2005), meanwhile, talks about soft repression distinguishing different forms of it, namely ridicule, stigma and silence. All the different forms of repression –state and non-state, hard and soft– Linden and Klandermans (2006) argue, work at the same time. However, I adopt a definition of repression, which builds upon a consensus in the literature of protest policing regarding the main characteristics of the phenomenon. Accordingly, I define repression as *any action that is directed by state security forces to prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional collective action, including its initiation*, as Earl (2011: 263) defines it, *and that is public and observable*³.

Put simply, repression is understood as overt forms of security forces’ action to impede mobilization, harass and intimidate activists, divide organizations and physically assault (pushing, shoving, hitting, beating), arrest, imprison and/or kill protesters and movement participants as they were reported by newspapers and the media.⁴ Although this paper will specifically discuss repression, it is important to clarify that authorities often respond with repression and negotiation/cooptation simultaneously (Piven 1977). Thus, I do not wish to suggest that repression⁵ is the only response to episodes of contentious collective action⁶. Accordingly, for example, the government might be responding to repeated roadblocks in demand of more jobs by launching a new welfare program and, at the same time, have police arrest protesters who were blockading the road. This is important because the state is not a monolithic entity with unified goals and interests that result in rational policies. This leads us to the next section where I discuss the theories that guide protest policing.

³ For different forms of covert repression, such as surveillance, see (Cunningham 2003, 2004, 2009; Irons 2006, Davenport 2005).

⁴ Actions such as surveillance, spying, silencing, stigma, ridicule and other forms of covert repression will be mentioned but are not part of this study.

⁵ I will use the words repression and policing interchangeably following the way newspaper reports narrate the control of contentious collective actions.

⁶ I adopt Charles Tilly's definition of discontinuous contentious collective action, which are “those occasions where people act together on their interests in ways that visibly and significantly affect other people's interests. Discontinuous, contentious collective action always involves third parties, often poses threats to existing distributions of power, and usually incites surveillance, intervention, and/or repression by political authorities (Tilly 1986,)”

Protest Policing Models

According to the *political process model*, social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald explain that *social movements result when expanding political opportunities are seized by people who are formally or informally organized, aggrieved, and optimistic that they can successfully redress their concerns* (1996: 8). Yet scholars disagree as to what counts as a political opportunity. The political process model addresses some of the difficulties with the narrow political opportunity concept, adding social/organization and cultural factors to the latter's political ones (Goodwin 2004):17).

Political process researchers focus on the influence of the political system on the repression and policing of protests. Research suggests that state reactions to challengers are influenced by specific characteristics of the political opportunity structure: in particular, the existing dominant culture and institutions (della Porta 1998: 229). These researchers differentiate between *stable opportunities* and more *volatile opportunities*. In the case of stable opportunities, a certain style and strategy of policing develops which includes institutional –such as the police organization, law codes, and constitutional rights– as well as cultural variables –such as the conceptions of the state and citizens' rights. Besides the stable context, open or volatile opportunities also influence policing styles. That is, protest policing is also a result of the interactions of various actors and evolving “configurations of power⁷” (della Porta 1995).

According to Davenport (2005, xvii), it was generally believed that the political opportunity structure within democratic contexts is uniformly structured toward pacifistic protest policing. That is, in democracies, authorities are less inclined to engage in aggressive and violent repressive activity. In addition, there should be higher levels of protests. This claim has been challenged, and great variation has been found in democracies with stable political opportunity structures (Earl 2011).

Several scholars (della Porta, 1995; della Porta and Reiter 1998; McCarthy et al 1999, McPhail et al 1998), in this line, have conceptualized *styles of protest policing*. Donatella della Porta theorizes protest policing styles based on contrasting police behavior. In *Policing Protest, The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, della Porta and Reiter synthesize the three most significant tactical tendencies characterizing protest policing in the 1990s as a) underenforcement of the law; b) the search to negotiate; c) large scale collection of information. Law-breaking became tolerated by police during protest events as it was considered less important than maintaining peace. Also after a wave of escalated violence during the 1960s and 1970s, complicated procedures of negotiation emerged; and the gathering of information and surveillance of protesters by police increased in 1990s (Porta and Reiter 1998). 6-7

Meanwhile, and mainly for the United States, McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy (McPhail, Schweingruber et al. 1998) mention *public order management systems* (POMS) and they focus on more general changes in levels of repression over time. The authors explain the escalated force and negotiated management models of protest policing. For the escalated force policing style, any show of force or violence by the protestors was met with overwhelming force in return (McPhail et al., 1998). This philosophy was dominant in the 1960s and 1970s in the USA and was based on what

⁷ See Kriesi, H (1989) The Political Opportunity Structure of the Dutch Peace Movement. *West European Politics*, 12, 295-312.

David Schweingruber calls mob sociology (Schweingruber 2000). Under this style of policing, law enforcement relies primarily on violence, arrests, and other forms of coercion when engaging with demonstrators.

As a response to the increasing violence during protest events in this period, a new style of policing came to dominate responses to protest. The negotiated management strategy emerged based on greater cooperation between police and demonstrators and an effort to avoid violence. The new approach called for the protection of free speech rights, toleration of community disruption, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, avoidance of arrests, and limiting the use of force to situations where violence is occurring. This approach is currently in place in many parts of the USA and Western Europe today.

In addition to the styles of protest policing, existing work on the study of protest repression have focused on the reactive measures. That is, aside from policing styles, there are certain features of protests, which are expected to result in different degrees of repression: the level of violence and disruptiveness, the conflict's intensity, the variety of protest strategies (Davenport 1995b; Tilly 1978). For this line of research, the more threatening a movement or protest event is to political elites the more likely it is to be the target of protest control (Earl 2003; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Earl 2006). That is, police are more likely to act (and to act in an aggressive manner) when protests are violent, numerous, directly challenging political authorities, organized and using multiple and innovative tactics. It is not clear how this reactions by police combine with the policing styles but Davenport (Davenport 2007) states that this **threat approach**, which focuses on the characteristics of the protest, is the dominant approach to repression and a review of the literature (Davenport, Soule and Armstrong 2011; Davenport 1995b; Earl 2003; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003) seems to confirm it.

In contrast to this strand, scholars focusing on the protest to explain policing have also argued for the **weakness approach** to protest control. According to this school, repression might be dangerous for power holders because elites risk public ridicule if they fail in their repressive attempts (Gamsom 1975). Thus, power holders will only repress movements that they think will collapse under pressure. Another set of variables that have been discussed in the literature on repression pertain to the actual demonstrators. How does the race, gender, ethnicity or income level of protesters impact repression? Which groups are considered more threatening and why? Davenport et al (2011) examine the impact of protesters' race on police response. The authors find that, with variations over time, African American protest events are more likely than white protest events to draw police presence and that once at events, police are more likely to take action at African American protest events. Stockdill (1996) and Wood (2007) also find that minorities are subject to harsher repression. Stockdill's study of the impact of repression on the AIDS movement (1996) is consistent with a **combined approach to threat and weakness** which indicates that severe repression is more likely when a movement or protest event is highly threatening and primarily composed of socially marginalized participants. Stockdill found that repression has served to undermine collective action targeting the AIDS crisis. However, Stockdill's study focused on the effects of repression on participants and not on what explains repression.

Organizational and neo-institutional theorists agree that the **agencies and actors engaged on the frontlines of repressive decision-making** and implementation are

critical. It is police officers, military personnel, state bureaucratic officials and prosecutors –the actors most proximate to the enforcement of protest control– that are highlighted in explanations. These actors are influenced by their own unique institutional positions and the overall logics of their institutions. Earl and Soule (2006) elaborate what they call the blue approach to control. They examine not what elites see as threatening but what police agencies and officers are likely to find threatening. They argue that this “peculiar institutional characteristic of the police structures protest control” (Earl, J and Soule, S 2006:149). Cunningham’s (Cunningham 2003) work on the FBI’s covert counterintelligence program, COINTELPRO, shows how the internal organizational structure of the FBI decisively shaped FBI action toward the New Left and toward white “hate groups” such as the KKK. For this approach, organizational and institutional features –resources, tactics, structure– of policing structures play a significant role in the structuring the form and pattern of repressive activity (Cunningham 2003:210). Law enforcers’ motivations, interests and capacities are also important to explain protest policing.

Limitations of the Existing Explanations

Although extremely vast and varied the literature on repression and protest policing is in need of further research. In what follows, I briefly identify some of these limitations to the models of protest policing presented above.

Characteristics of the protesters: Except for the aforementioned studies, the literature on repression has not focused much attention on the *features of the protesters* to explain repression. Do protesters themselves –aside from what tactics they use, how many they are, or whether they are violent– have an impact on the characteristics of repression? What characteristics of the protesters, if any, have an influence on police action and policing styles? As was mentioned earlier, Davenport, Soule et al (2011) found evidence that supports a bias in police action based on the race of demonstrators. Does repression vary based on the gender, ethnicity, or income level of the protesters? This is important because the actions of police might not be a response to the actions of protesters. The criminalization of the poor and police violence (and often state agencies’ violence) towards the poor or other marginal groups should not surprise us if is replicated during protests. Studies of protest policing should look at whether the marginality of protesters also matters and might shape police perceptions. Marginality understood as a result of rising inequality in the context of overall economic advancement –and not necessarily economic backwardness (Sassen 1991; Wacquant 2008); deproletarianization; temporary and unprotected jobs; the retrenchment and disarticulation of the welfare state; and territorial stigmatization. Here I would include groups, which not necessarily constitute a social class in the traditional sense. For example, minority groups –ethnic, religious– and groups that for different reasons are subject to institutional discrimination and violence such as LGBT people. Aside from marginality, are other characteristics of protesters subject to police violence?

Characteristics of the target: Auyero and Moran (2007) found evidence that suggests researchers should also pay attention to the *claims and target* of the protests. In the 2001 looting episodes of Argentina, police ignored looting episodes at small stores but was

present to protect large supermarket chains. The authors argued that the state decided to use its resources to control looting episodes that could affect large and powerful corporations while ignoring small stores. Why? Intuitively, one would think that large supermarket chains were more heavily guarded because more people would be interested in looting them. Yet, this was not the case. What then made state forces ignore small stores and direct police to protect large chain supermarkets? Did the size of the target (such as small or large supermarkets) influence state forces presence or absence? Was it the location of the supermarkets? Auyero & Moran explained this absence of police at small stores with the type of target selected for looting and its association with powerful economic and political interests. In other words, the state responded to the looting episodes with the political decision of protecting large and powerful corporations and ignoring small stores.

The example above provides support for the threat hypothesis. Since the possibility of demonstrators looting high chain supermarket posed a threat to economic elites –and therefore to authorities–, the state decided to send state forces to protect these supermarkets. However, and given the characteristics of the looters (mostly poor, unemployed and marginal groups) this case also showed support to a threat and weakness approach combined. According to this school protests that are both weak and threatening are the most likely to be repressed (Earl 2003: 54). Earl (2011: 266) argued that researchers must attend to those being threatened –elites and/or control agents. In centralized policing systems common in Western Europe (della Porta 1995, Wisler and Kriesi 1998) threat to elites are clearly important. However, other argue that in more decentralized policing structures, threats to the repressive actors –police, for example– matter more than threats to political elites (Waddington 1998). This approach needs further investigation to illuminate whether certain claims, characteristics of demonstrators, and some targets are subject to more violent policing.

Characteristics of policing agencies and structures: Studies on protest policing that focus on police argue that security forces are influenced by their own unique institutional positions and the overall logics of their institutions. In the Latin American context, the characteristics of policing agencies and structures needs to be examined in the light of its history of authoritarian governments and militarization of police. That is, the policing of protests in contemporary Argentina need be studied taking into account the *historical traditions, roles, and functions of security forces* and how they have traditionally dealt with demonstrations.

Is the form of protest policing (with use of violent force for some, and doing nothing for others) administered based on stereotypes that police officers have about disorders and disordered behavior? State forces might actually police differently, or with different degrees, groups, individuals, with whom they anticipate difficulty. Who are these groups or individuals? Generalizations about people with certain skin color, who live in certain neighborhoods, and so on, might be associated with an historical definition of public disorder and violence. What do policing agents perceive as threatening?

In addition, as the policing styles theories indicate, knowing about how police mobilize during major events is very useful. Yet, in a context of constant mobilizations, scarce resources, and uneven democratic practices it is difficult to differentiate between protest policing strategies without taking into account regional differences that affect

state security forces. Thus, in the Latin American context, a different type of protest policing model is in place and needs to be theorized.

Political dynamics: As was mentioned earlier, the political process model takes into account how political opportunities shape protest policing. However, the explanations provided do not pay much attention to variations in protest policing according to local political dynamics and diverse local social contexts. In Argentina, the way politics is organized and practiced across the country varies greatly. Recent studies have focused on the different nature and characteristics of democratization processes at the subnational level (Behrend 2011, Gibson 2009). Some scholars have turned their attention to what they see as a persistence of less democratic, authoritarian or semiauthoritarian subnational units in nationally democratic countries (Behrend 2011, 151). It is not uncommon to read about human rights violations and excessive police violence in some provinces. Are these subnational units indeed less democratic? How? And in what ways are there variations in protest policing styles within a democratic country?

Social, Political and Economic Context: When looking at protest policing policies, it is important to also pay attention to what Ann Swidler (Swidler 1986) names “habits” and “sensibilities”. I take these to mean that much of what actors do is determined by their past experience and by the ways in which they are used to act. States, police and security forces, which have carried certain policies in the past would therefore be more likely to employ similar measures later on, often regardless of the past success of these policies or of external pressures to change their behaviors. Similarly, just as traditions, common sense, material artifacts, idioms, rituals, new routines, know-how, identities, discourse, and speech genres also constrain and enables collective actions in different ways (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 24), they constrain and enable the policing of demonstrations. Thus, protest policing should be studied, and theorized, based on the context in which a state’s security forces operate.

Most of the research on the policing of protests has favored studies of North American and European cases (Cunningham 2003; Earl and Soule 2006; Soule and Davenport 2009; Davenport, Soule et al. 2011). This is surprising since countries in other parts of the world have witnessed massive protests and opportunities to study security forces’ involvement. Since the 1990s several forms of protests have emerged in Latin America and few studies address the policing of these events. Some scholars in Latin America are conducting research on what is becoming known as the criminalization of protests. According to this line of research, as a result of neoliberal policies, nation states in the region are strengthening their institutional repressive system with the goal of controlling social protests. In Argentina, the shift toward neoliberalism began during the dictatorship of 1976-1983 but it was deepened during the administration of Carlos Menem in the early 1990s. Some of the reforms implemented included the privatization of state-owned companies, the liberalization of commerce, a flexibilization of labor markets, and the decentralization of the education and health services to the provincial administrations. As a result of these policies, a “wave of transgressive political contention” spread throughout Argentina where a “heterogeneous mass of unemployed and otherwise disadvantaged citizens developed alternative means of dissent and organizations” (Villalon 2007). The emergence of the *piquetero* movement should be

contemplated in protest policing studies.

Discussion

During the 1990s in Argentina, informal workers, *piqueteros*, and unemployed –marginalized groups– became active organizers of collective actions. One reason for this, Candelaria Garay (2007) argued is that workfare programs favored common interests and identities on the part of unemployed workers allowing them to overcome barriers to collective action. That is, traditional explanations account for the upsurge in marginal groups collective action in Argentina by pointing to a context of deprivation, lack of labor union support to the unemployed, and growing dissatisfaction with partisan clientelist practices that manipulated access to social benefits. Garay, in turn, offered a policy centered argument to explain this outbreak in informal workers and unemployed collective action, which includes two elements: 1) the features of the policy design that encouraged collective action and (2) state responses to policy demands. The emergence of contentious collective action by dismissed, and unemployed workers came with a new form of action: the roadblock or picket (the *piquete* and the *piqueteros*).

Roadblocks started in Patagonia in the 1990s to protest layoffs by companies of which entire towns depended on. Soon, pickets spread across Argentina (Svampa and Pereyra 2003). The picket consisted of blocking the main roads or access routes to cities by burning tires and parking vehicles to complete the barrier. Protesters would hold banners, sign songs and bring their families to the roadblock. Sometimes, the picket would include a soup kitchen. Initially, the participants of the roadblocks were mostly “displaced workers, informal laborers, and underemployed and unemployed people—mostly low-income, nonunionized, and institutionally unprotected” (Villalón 2007, 148). The composition of the crowds during roadblocks changed as this form of action became widespread across the country and economic sectors. Yet, very soon, authorities and the media started depicting the *piqueteros* and unemployed groups as violent, accusing them of commencing disturbances and even robberies, and lootings (Rodriguez 2004; Svampa 2004). This, in turn, led to high levels of police control and imprisonment of protesters during the 1990s.

According to Argentine human rights organization CELS, beginning in 1996 there has been an increase in the number of state-led repressive actions against different forms of collective action. Thousands of protesters have been prosecuted and criminally charged for their participation in demonstrations (CELS 2003). Additionally, and also during protests events, several people have died, others were seriously injured. Police brutality during detention has also been reported. This increase in police violence at protest events, CELS reported, was followed by a disproportioned and illegitimate use of violence by different security forces –at the national and provincial level (CELS 2003). What’s more, in many cases the federal justice ordered the repressive actions, and as Auyero (Auyero 2010) described, the “visible fists” of the state⁸ did not act alone⁹.

⁸ By visible fists Auyero (2010) made reference to open, visible repression of protests and collective action.

⁹ In Auyero’s words: the visible fists have “openly repressed protests organized by the unemployed, persistently criminalized contentious collective action, dramatically increased the prison population, engaged in high levels of police violence against poor youth, deployed military-style forces such as the National Guard to occupy and rein in certain destitute (and highly stigmatized) urban areas under the guise of ‘safety’, and sharply increased the number of evictions carried out by state agents on private and public property (2011: 4).

Clandestine kicks and invisible elbows have also been active in the state's control and discouragement of collective actions. For example, the city of Buenos Aires, a few years ago saw the emergence of "tasks forces" which were civilians recruited to use threat and violence to evict people squatting in parks, sleeping on the streets or occupying buildings¹⁰.

However, based on publications and legislations that guide protest policing in contemporary Argentina, police here seemed to favor some type of *negotiated management* approach to demonstrations. The protocol "Police Action in Public Demonstrations" (Actuación Policial en Manifestaciones Públicas) states that since 2003, the Argentine government fosters a no repression of protests policy. However, the protocol was only approved in 2011 and recent events in different parts of the country indicate that this police action protocol is unevenly enforced across the country. In the past year (2013- 2014), for instance, police forces in the City of Buenos Aires, the province of Córdoba, Formosa, and La Rioja used extremely violent forms of action to end very different protest events. In the City of Buenos Aires, plans by the Mayor to build a civic center in land that is currently occupied by a psychiatric hospital was challenged by different people. Groups of state workers, legislators, hospital workers and journalists resisted the beginning of demolition works and were heavily repressed resulting in 60 people injured and 8 arrested¹¹. Earlier, a court order had sentenced to stop construction works on those grounds. In Córdoba, police arrested five people after pushing and shoving them outside a police station while they were demanding the release of fellow demonstrators¹². In the northern province of Formosa, people from the aboriginal community Qom have been repeatedly attacked and threatened by thugs and state forces. The violence came while the Qom population is protesting for the right to their land¹³. Similarly, in the province of La Rioja, local police used rubber bullets and gas to disperse an assembly protesting mining works, resulting in several people injured (Agregar FUENTES y fechas).

How do protest-policing models account for such variation within Argentina? In her study of provincial closed games, Jacqueline Behrend stated that in spite of the occasional episodes of repression or outbreaks of violence, "it is fair to say that all Argentine provinces have reasonably democratic regimes"¹⁴ (Behrend 2011) 152-153). However, far from occasional, the episodes of repression and state violence make frequent appearances in the media throughout Argentina. In addition, human rights groups such as CELS and CORREPI) denounce that police violence and excessive use of

¹⁰ The name of the group is UCEP (Unidad de Control de Espacio Público) and it's a dependency of the Public Spaces Ministry of the Buenos Aires City:

<http://www.diarioperfil.com.ar/edimp/0313/articulo.php?art=11084&ed=0313#sigue>

<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-121364-2009-03-12.html>

<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-162997-2011-02-24.html>

¹¹ <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1578392-la-defensoria-cuestiono-la-represion-en-el-borda>,

<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-244831-2014-04-24.html>,

<http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-218896-2013-04-27.html>

¹² http://www.agenciawalsh.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12555&Itemid=69

¹³ <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-253477-2014-08-21.html>

¹⁴ "they hold regular and clean elections; there is universal adult suffrage, freedom of speech, and freedom to organize public protests; there are opposition parties that win legislative seats or municipalities; no political parties are banned; and the media is not subject to censorship or totalitarian control" (Behrend 2011, 152-153).

force by security agents during protest events is quite common. Consequently, citizens' political opportunity to organize and make claims is restricted.

Contentious collective action takes place in response or as a result of political decisions and larger structural phenomena. Theories of protest policing should also contemplate variations in the forms of democratization but also in police practices from the national level to the subnational regions. Additionally, a model for analyzing protest policing should take into account the history and trajectories of the security forces as well as its connections, alliances with the judicial system. As was mentioned earlier, it is often a judge who orders the repressive action.

Also, how does policing vary based on the political alliances between local and federal authorities? How protest policing varies when local and national governments are not from opposing political parties or from divisions in the same ruling party. All of these should be considered when drafting a broader model of protest policing.

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